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Perhaps if more of us were devoted country music fans we would understand better.
All those bad things that happen when you least expect them. Then-to make it
right-we could play the song backwards, thereby regaining car, dog, job, and lost
true love.'
A cloud of melancholy has descended upon the legal profession. Lawyers say they are not
having much fun any more. This is in stark contrast to what they remember or have heard about
the lives led by lawyers merely a few years ago. Judges complain about being unappreciated
but also targeted for unfair media scrutiny; because of the multitude of constraints and efficiency
pressures now imposed on them, many judges report that their work has begun to resemble that
of low-level bureaucrats, except that a judge cannot hide. These complaints, and a floodtide of
others, arise from the lives of many lawyers, judges, and even jurors. By now, it is a clich6 to
note that lawyers seem to be miserable. Increased competition, diminished civility, rampant
bureaucratization, overspecialization, and grievous overwork combine to form a familiar,
unpalatable portrait. In the eyes of the public, the legal profession is in great disrepute; lawyer
jokes proliferate like poison ivy. To add injury to insult, leading lights within the Bar and in
legal academia now have joined the chorus. We have a plethora of articles and books that
bemoan the failed ideals of lost lawyers and the undue influence that lawyers purportedly have
throughout the United States. Moreover, study after study tells us of the growing malaise-not
to say panic-that seems to flood over more and more lawyers, no matter how apparently
successful they may be.
So there are, to be sure, numerous "objective" explanations for the misery so widely felt
and so frequently described among contemporary lawyers and judges. But there are other, more
subtle issues at stake as well. Lawyers surely cannot be isolated from the society surrounding
us, and much of the angst deeply felt by lawyers reflects some of our deepest societal problems
today. Nevertheless, widespread lawyer misery also reflects subtle but powerful shortcomings
in understanding some of the essentials of the lawyer's art and craft.
Mystic Chords of Memory
We are awash in grief over the passing of a golden age of lawyer-statesmen with practical
judgment. We hear repeated regret about the demise of old-fashioned common law lawyers,
experts in understanding context and gradually trying to adjust to change.2 Taken together with
countless speeches, bar journal articles, and flourishing new national media that now focus on
lawyers, these books tend to exaggerate the influence of lawyers, while downplaying the obverse
impact that societal changes have had on the practice of law. Moreover, mournful celebrations
of a lost golden age-an abstract time that never really existed-help produce what David
Wilkins aptly has called "a debilitating nostalgia that is likely to reinforce, rather than to
counteract, the cynicism and abdication of moral responsibility by contemporary practitioners."3
Also lost in all the surveys and studies of malaise is the considerable progress made over
the past three decades on several crucial fronts. The poor and oppressed, for example, now have
much better access to the legal system, though much of this progress currently is at grave risk.
The legal community also has much greater concern about, and has achieved much greater
success in allowing diversity in our jury rooms, the bar, and the bench. Our present success,
though still limited, tends to help us forget, for example, that the ABA did not admit African-
Americans until the 1960s and that women, with a tiny set of noteworthy exceptions, were
basically not seen or heard within mainstream legal institutions until the late 1960s.
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No one can deny, however, that the life of any young associate in any Howey, Billum, &
Singh big law firm, with a home office looking down from high above Downtown, U.S.A.,
actually is overloaded with too much tedious work and too little time to develop and enjoy the
craft of lawyering. Nor does that associate even have time to enjoy the considerable monetary
rewards that often follow when so many produce such extraordinary billable hours for so few.
The fact that the number of lawyers in our nation has more than doubled since 1960 has only
increased the competitive atmosphere. Moreover, partnership is no longer assured even for
dedicated and extremely hard-working associates, as it generally once was "in the normal course
of things." Those who wish to work on behalf of a cause find only a handful of low-paying jobs
for which they must vigorously compete.
Lawyers love threes. It may have something to do with residual trinitarian faith or with
ancient Roman roots, but lawyers thrive on three-part tests and on three considerations in each
case. We also like to talk about on the one hand, and then on the other, particularly as we
question simple binary choices in law schools. On the one hand, however, by inducing so many
of our students to run up monumental debts to pay for their legal educations, law schools
themselves are directly implicated in today's malaise. Increasingly, law schools have begun to
look like they are largely in the business of selling dreams. In fact, today many lawyers are
making much more money than ever before. Those earnings, once closely guarded secrets, are
now proudly trumpeted and widely disseminated. Even good publicity about the bottom line
adds to competitive pressures and reinforces feelings of inadequacy, jealousy, and rage both
from within and from outside the legal profession.
Amid all the gnashing of teeth and pointing of fingers today (on the other hand, as it were),
we pay too little attention to vital, direct threats to the qualities of good lawyering that set our
profession apart. Taking time to ask why may help explain the clear trend away from viewing
law as a profession and towards seeing it, with clear-eyed realism, as a legal business. Make no
mistake: our nation's legal practice has never been far removed from business and power. But
our times are different, the media is more scathing, and the bottom line has become much more
dominant in a culture seemingly ever more emphatic about winner-take-all. Amid the clamor
over failed ideals and lost glory, however, we are missing some quite basic elements that still
define and separate legal craftsmanship from other profit-making ventures. Perhaps we cannot
resist the race to the short-term, bottom-line measures of success that are such a fixation of our
times. Amid the staccato of fragmentation and excess, however, finding time to take our time
has become even more precious than billable hours.
Chords for Three Hands
It is with sensitivity to the third hand-such third-hand awareness is the point where many
lawyers make their livings-that we can perceive a fundamental and revealing tension. The
tension directly involves the art and craft of lawyering. It centers around time. Key aspects can
be counted on three fingers (at which point one may have struck out, and be on the way back to
the dugout). This essay suggests that three crucial significant locations for the development of
angst are: the attachment/detachment dilemma, transactions within a transitional world, and
desperately seeking justice. Much of today's angst among lawyers, judges, and jurors emanates
from sources beneath or beyond the "objective" explanations. By better understanding three
key factors, we may be able to reduce time spent worrying, and being pushed too quickly down
towards the bottom line. Then together we could concentrate on matters more relevant to the
craft of lawyering. To address the basic problem will require less efficiency and more careful
conversation. In contrast to the current vogue that focuses on narrative and story-telling, I want
to underscore listening, and listening well.4 Everyone has many stories. And we should all
know that there are stories-and then there are stories. It takes a skilled listener to supply the
context, and to add the discernment, necessary to distinguish among myriad stories. That kind
of listener is likely to be a particularly effective lawyer.
1. The Attachment/Detachment Tension
In his great poem "September 1, 1939" W. H. Auden wrote of a universal hunger and
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linked it to hope, even though the poem's title marked the Nazi invasion of Poland and the start
of World War II. Auden described a common feature of humanity:
For the error bred in the bone
Of each woman and each man
Craves what it cannot have,
Not universal love
But to be loved alone.'
Auden soon scrapped the stanza, and he later refused to reprint the entire poem. His mood
turned even gloomier than this poem's description of a world "defenceless under the night." In
the context of "international wrong," it had become necessary again for "Faces along the bar"
to "cling to their average day." Otherwise:
we should see where we are,
Lost in a haunted wood,
Children afraid of the night
Who have never been happy or good.
Each of us does seem to crave being loved alone. All claim to be unique individuals, thereby
somehow finding shelter and connection. Yet such love always turns out to require someone
else. Anyone who has been a parent-or a child, for that matter-has had to struggle not so
much with the issue of whether to be attached and detached but rather with the appropriate
degrees of separation and connection at any particular time. Relationships are built and often
founder on how attached and detached people should be both in a specific context and over
time.
The tensions of attachment and detachment permeate all our lives. Yet the struggle is
heightened for lawyers. The dilemma of balancing attachment and detachment is inherent in
the task of representing others. To represent another always means to suppress part of one's
own individuality. As Clyde Spillinger pointed out in his recent essay delving into the complexity
of Louis Brandeis's famous stance as the "lawyer to the situation," representation always entails
relatedness.6 Jurors and judges must also grapple with the dilemma of representation-though
this fact might not be obvious at first. Jury representation is key in recent decisions about
peremptory challenges, for example-to say nothing of the scrutiny we now afford the
"representativeness" of the venire. We also allow attorneys to try to convince jurors to use their
decision to encompass a principle, to represent others by "sending a message." The jury's role
long has been understood to include, at least in part, the application and expression of the
views, and even the consciences, of the myriad communities from which the jurors are drawn.
During our founding era, in fact, jury service was considered a basic component of
representative government, essential to guarantee the liberty and security of the people.' In the
period leading up to the drafting and ratification of the federal constitution, juries actually
performed most of what we would today call the administrative functions of town government.
White male freeholders circa 1775 expected to serve on juries at least dozens, and even hundreds
of times, during their adult lives. Moreover, no one seriously doubted until well into the next
century that jurors were to decide both facts and law.
Even if this somewhat unfamiliar perspective on jurors is acknowledged, it might seem
peculiar to extend the concept of representation-and the relatedness it entails-to judges.
Judges, after all, are supposed to be experts in discerning relatedness, but they are not themselves
generally considered related to or representative of anyone. Yet judges, above most others,
need the time and the inclination to listen to others actively and well. It is no accident that we
declare that a basic component of a judge's job is to "hear" cases. Judges are expected to be
impartial, of course, yet we should be wary of all those judges who strive to forget where they
came from in their pursuit of impartiality. Judges only fool themselves if they think they can
float above human attachments.' Paradoxically, we want them to be anchored that way. More
acutely than the rest of us, however, judges find themselves pressed from behind by the past
and blocked and driven back by the future.9 The very essence of their task involves the strain of
trying to treat like cases alike.
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Early in our lives within families or other social units, however, we discern that sometimes
to treat everyone the same way is to be unfair in an essential way. Different children have
different needs and abilities. It is a basic part of the American belief system that each individual
is unique and that individual differences should be considered in reaching judgments. We cherish
our individualism, yet we want to live within "a government of laws, and not of men." On a
basic level we also know, however, that "One law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression."10 To take
the time to understand context and complexity is to be extremely countercultural today. We live
in an era of sound-bites and instantaneous thumbs up or thumbs down judgments. Toting up
wins and losses with an eye out for the bottom line has become all-important, with attention
scarcely paid to how you play the game. (Red Sox fans are the exception: we keep watching,
though well aware that disaster is to be expected on all fronts.) Because many lawyers and
judges insist still that time be taken-and that those without ready access to the media still find
a place through law where they can be listened to somewhat-it is hardly surprising that the
legal system and those who work within it are now absorbing more than a fair share of criticism
and public outcry.
An examined life that wrestles seriously with the paradoxical nature of attachment and
detachment takes concentration, empathy, courage-and developing the ability to listen before
judging. It also takes time: time that is not devoted to the bottom line; time that is spent learning
to be comfortable without resolving-but instead living within-the attachment/detachment
dilemma. To develop this facet of the legal craft always remains an ongoing struggle. This may
help explain why it is said in the Talmud that, "The judge should feel as though a sword were
suspended above his head throughout the time he sits in judgment."" Yet the Talmud-which
may be considered a kind of written clearinghouse for an ongoing dialogue across generations-
also states that "Every judge who judges a case with complete fairness even for a single hour is
credited by the Torah as though he had become a partner to the Holy One, blessed be he, in the
work of creation."1 2
2. Transactions within a Transitional World
Americans are notoriously ahistorical. More than 150 years ago, Tocqueville made the
point with characteristic verve when he proclaimed, "The only historical remains in the United
States are the newspapers; if a number be wanting, the chain of time is broken and the present
is severed from the past."" Today in an era of virtually instantaneous information, it often
seems that to seek the past within a newspaper is quite old-fashioned, if not quaint. It is hardly
a new insight to note that American law is no exception to our propensity for presentism, and
that our law generally has always been unusually kinetic. More than in most legal systems, our
law has been in relatively rapid transition for hundreds of years. Indeed, this sense of law as
kinetic was one of the touchstones of the founding era. The crucial running battles surrounding
the growth of both public power and private rights helps to explain the extraordinary importance
attributed to lawyers and the judiciary in the development of the United States.14
American law in transition always has involved a great deal of transactional law.
Consideration of the legal career of the great antebellum lawyer, orator, and politician Daniel
Webster provides a useful illustration and a cautionary tale. Webster's early rural practice in
New Hampshire revolved around constantly mediating an integral local network of credit and
debt. After he moved to Boston and Washington, Webster achieved legendary status for his 180
appearances before the United States Supreme Court and his famous speeches. Yet he made a
very good living through his more subterranean representation of the interests of an intertwined
Boston elite. Constantly short of cash because of his extravagant spending, Webster's successful
legal practice depended on his role in many of the major corporate transactions of his time. He
and his corporate clients both affected and were affected by the rapid changes in American law.
"It is one of the ironies of American history," however, "that the rise in status of Webster and
other lawyers was built upon the foundation of their increased dependency.""
Most people and even most lawyers were not much aware of the extremely malleable
nature of law either during or after Webster's time on the national stage. (We will return to
another aspect of Webster's career shortly.) Particularly in the era of legal formalism, there was
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an impulse, almost a hunger, to consider law to be almost mechanical. A and B would have a
dispute over Blackacre. The judge, having heard the lawyers, would go look up the answer and
settle the dispute conclusively. We now know better, however, that "whoever wins it won't be
for good and it won't be for long"-as Faulkner may have said (though I have never been able
to find the citation again). While lawyers and businessmen long have been closely allied, in the
old days they had the time to talk, which led to mutual understanding and advice that was
valued for more than a temporary blip in the international flow of capital. Understanding and
loyalty often flowed from repeated opportunities to converse. The lawyer was conversant with
the banker's problems and ambitions, and vice versa. As former Dean Michael J. Kelly recently
pointed out, "Money and prestige cannot be extricated from the history of the American legal
profession."' 6
Most of us who work in the legal system now work within organizations. These organizations
make major claims on our limited time and on our increasingly short attention spans. As the
world around us seems to grow more fragmented every day, the organizations that surround
lawyers and the separate legal cultures they embody are sources of authority over us, but they
are also needed sources for much of the authority we enjoy. There are in fact separate legal
cultures embodied in the quite diverse organizations in which we work. 7 To understand the
differences takes time and care. Such an understanding of the importance of discrete institutional
customs and usages makes the world look more kaleidoscopic, more densely populated by
diverse, particularistic anthropological units. It also helps us understand that good lawyers
never were-and cannot be-isolated individualists.
We should also recognize that expressions of despair at the generalized decline of civility
and professionalism in the practice of law are hardly new. In 1869, for example, the scion of a
leading Philadelphia family wrote the following familiar-sounding words about an acquaintance
who decided to give up law to study divinity:
It by no means follows that a successful lawyer is a gentleman, that he is a man of
honor, or that he has received a liberal education, and indeed those who are now
most successful in making money, the great object of all, are notoriously deficient
in these qualities, which were once regarded as requisites. The bar & bench, too,
have fallen very far below the dignified & respectable position it held when I knew
it thirty years ago. I saw & knew the last of the old set who gave it so much influence
& reputation ... all of them distinguished for learning & ability,. . . all of them,
too, with scarcely an exception, worthy of all confidence & respect for integrity,
professional honor, and moral worth.... All is now changed-culture, elegance,
refinement, courtesy, eloquence, wit, scholarship have vanished."
Sydney George Fisher exaggerated, of course, but he was basically correct about the reduced
influence within the Philadelphia bar of those who were "gentlemen by culture, birth, and
manners." 9 Yet in other places, in other times, and in different kinds of law practice, the legal
profession has provided crucial opportunities. Law practice has been the key to respectability
for members of downtrodden groups-often in the face of great resistance from the professional
elite.20
Awareness about our nation's diverse legal cultures-and the ability to negotiate within
and among them-is a basic part of the expertise American lawyers provide for our clients. Yet
we often forget how this very diversity of legal cultures underscores the kinetic quality of law.
This problem is exaggerated because we live in a society that seems to grow ever more frustrated
with any time-frame of more than fifteen minutes, and any result that is not clear and final. We
have a national hunger for half-baked anecdotes. Through headlines, talk shows, and quickly
controlled spins on the news, anecdotes become the basis for snap decision-making. We also
seem to hunger today for definitive decisions at almost any cost. At their best, however, lawyers
tend to slow things down and to add complexity that makes snap judgments more difficult.
Over forty years ago, David Riesman noted that lawyers are indeed feared and disliked, but
lawyers are also needed "because of their matter-of-factness, their sense of relevance, their
refusal to be impressed by magical 'solutions' to people's problems."' One popular critique
bemoans the overrepresentation of lawyers in our political system.2 2 Another retransmits and
177
Who Took the Awe Out of Law?
inflates the relative number of lawyers in our society compared to other cultures. As with other
exaggerated stories about damages for apparently frivolous lawsuits or hand wringing about
what a litigious society we have become, the facts about such matters do not catch up with the
sweeping allegations that seem to seize the public imagination. 23
Though Marc Galanter may have understated the time-frame, he put his finger on a crucial
modem tendency when he observed that the sense of decline from a noble legal profession
suffused with civic virtue to commercialism "has been a recurrent theme for at least a hundred
years."24 Moreover, the period when virtue last prevailed generally seems to have been "just
over the receding horizon of personal experience." This declension story seems to permeate
our public life, but it is particularly noticeable in discussions of our legal system. As Cicero
once proclaimed, however, "Not to know history means to remain forever a child." 25 Our nation
tends to be quite childish in this regard, and to celebrate a mystical, sanitized past when we
heed history at all. Still, it remains a shock when judges and leading legal scholars simply
proclaim an ideal and then assign it some place in the past.
Daniel Webster, for example, is frequently mentioned as an exemplary lawyer-statesman,
celebrated as a representative figure for moral virtues, character, and practical wisdom. 26 Like
dreams, however, we should be careful in choosing our ideals. The facts of Webster's life, such
as we can discern them, should be relevant. For instance, even his sympathetic recent biographer
summarized Webster's career as replete with questions about his integrity. As Maurice Baxter
put it, "The distinction between [Webster's] personal transactions and public business was a
very fine one." Baxter finally had to conclude that Webster "was culpable of serious
impropriety"(502). In his magisterial biography of Justice Joseph Story, distinguished historian
Kent Newmyer noted that Story and Webster had a direct, collaborative relationship that was
"one of the most extraordinary in American law and politics"-a working alliance of great
mutual benefit that also was surely of "questionable propriety."27 Additionally, Webster was
secretly on the payroll of several groups of New England capitalists, from whom he received
very large sums (389, 448 n. 25).
There are also crucial aspects of Webster's public role that apparently were not known, or
were not considered relevant, in painting his portrait as an ideal lawyer-statesman. Webster was
a hidebound conservative who adamantly opposed the separation of church and state; he played
a key role in opposing what he saw as too much democratization and in vehemently seeking to
protect major property holdings. In his last years, Webster was widely vilified throughout the
antislavery north, and particularly bitterly excoriated in his beloved New England, for the key
role he played in the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, a draconian statute that forced
the return of slaves without even minimal due process.28 We are well-advised to seek heroes.
Yet even if it makes that search more frustrating, we ought to find out what we can about them,
too.
At the moment, the United States Supreme Court seems bent on leading us down the
ahistorical path. In the Court's fervor for clear answers about such fundamental issues as race,
sovereignty, and the treatment of Native Americans, history is ignored or distorted beyond
recognition. 29 Nuance and context are simply irrelevant. The quest instead is for a clear, readily
recyclable ideal of an original constitutional moment, flash-frozen and thereby rendered timeless.
Nonetheless, it remains the task of lawyers to try to understand the past and to look to the
future, fully aware of contingency and context-and the complexity rooted in human frailty.
3. Desperately Seeking Justice.
It is well known that the Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote: "I have said to my
brethren many times that I hate justice, which means that I know if a man begins to talk about
that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms."3 0 Generally we seem to
have become devotees of astringent Holmesian thinking that either denigrates or entirely rejects
considerations of justice within law. In many law schools, justice is whispered about at best; in
some, talk of justice is mocked during first-year boot camp and virtually banned from the
classroom. Yet for all Holmes's emphasis in his famous "Path of the Law" speech on the bad
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man as properly the exclusive focus in law, and on the role of history and economics rather than
morality, Holmes himself relied on what could be intuited "in justice" as the criterion for an
answer to the prescription hypothetical he posed in that speech a century ago. Once he got past
the desired shock value of completely decoupling law and morality, Holmes resorted to deeply
rooted morality and "the deepest instincts of man" to decide in favor of the active entrepreneur
and against the inactive property holder within his hypothetical legal conundrum.3'
The point is not that Holmes was inconsistent within "The Path of the Law." That he certainly
was. Rather it is to notice that the search for justice keeps popping up as something lawyers
seemingly cannot avoid, whether we like it or not. Yet we should recognize that the search for
justice is inevitably frustrating. Seeking justice is like going east. You can go east and go east as
much as you would like-but you never get east. This helps explain why it often seems so
appealing to avoid worrying about justice and to hide instead behind the professional role of
zealous advocate. This role becomes sufficient both as end and means. For many lawyers and
judges, however, such professionalization comes at the cost of the reasons they went to law
school in the first place-perhaps inspired somewhat naively by "Perry Mason" or To Kill a
Mockingbird. It turns out, of course, that life is not so full of happy endings, or indeed full of
endings at all. Technique and role then become appealing insulation to cover the disappointment
of such hard-nosed discoveries. Forgotten in that mix is the great legal realist Karl Llewellyn's
important point: "Compassion without technique is a mess; technique without compassion is a
menace." 32
At some law schools, and in many lawyers' offices, homes, and hang-outs, justice is still
much discussed. The lawyers who share such concerns tend to be the kinds of people who
approach what Ralph Waldo Emerson called "sphericity." They do not rigidly try to separate
work and home, private and public, law and justice. At the same time, however, they know that
the mixture is always unstable, and that flux and tension are inevitable. Grant Gilmore has
sometimes been condemned as a nihilist, which he surely was not. He was profoundly skeptical,
to be sure, but he tied his skeptic's stance directly to the importance of lawyering done well.
Gilmore once described what he had learned from Wesley Sturgis, himself often called a nihilist.
Sturgis was "a lonely, great, and tragic figure" who refused to play child's games because he
had the courage of his bleak convictions. Nonetheless, in the fall of 1941, at the request of his
students, Sturgis taught an extra course on the common law forms of action, though he already
was teaching a full load and volunteering his time in government service for the defense effort
on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Sturgis's students-through taking extra time, by plunging into the
process of wrestling with complexity and by seeking justice in the details-learned "about the
use and the uses of words."" Much could follow from learning about words this way. Gilmore
summarized with characteristic aplomb: "I can think of few things that are more central to the
lawyer's craft and art. He taught us to be forever on our guard against the slippery generality,
the received principle, the authoritative proposition. He taught us to trust no one's judgment
except our own-and not to be too sure of that. He taught us to live by our wits. He taught us,
in a word, how to be lawyers" (139 n. 31).
Conclusion
The world seems to speed up and fall apart all around us. The factors are obvious: the
information explosion, the internationalization of markets and capital, the exquisitely complicated
personal demands within overworked families. We experience much time and motion, with
little time for emotion. What we can get instantaneously through computers and television
makes us increasingly desperate for, but less adept at, human connections. We have direct
access to more information than anyone could want, often in unmediated form. We speed up
and splinter simultaneously. Again we have become "dense commuters," who now move more
rapidly "From the conservative dark / Into the ethical life," but now we grow more inured to
"habit-forming pain / Mismanagement and grief."3 4
Such times demand interpreters, soothsayers, wise men and women of the tribe. Such times
particularly require good lawyers. Good lawyers will not solve the attachment/detachment
dilemmas that drive so many people to embrace simplistic binary choices between "either" and
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"or." We will not convince most people that change cannot be avoided, not even through law.
Nor can we do much to slow down the race to the bottom line. There is no stopping the widespread
passion to acquire the biggest heap, no matter what its content. There are shards everywhere,
and everybody has his or her reasons for further breakage. Yet good lawyers still may take the
time to listen, to listen skeptically, and to listen well. The best lawyers remain adept at hearing
the faint echoes of the past-and the hope of the future-in the small voices of those who
continue to seek justice after all these years. Even within "a world in stupor," Auden wrote,
"Ironic points of light / Flash out wherever the Just / Exchange their messages" (58-9).
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